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IS A CORPORATION A "PERSON"?
CLRENCE E. MARTI*

The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black in the case of
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company v. Johnson, and
his concurring opinion in the case of United Gas Public Service
Company v. Texas,2 both decided at the present term, have excited considerable interest in the legal realm, because of his interpretation of the property clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and his contention that the word "person" there found, does not
include corporations.
Because of the high judicial position Mr. Justice Black occupies, it might be wise to discuss and, in part, review the historical
setting of the present universal doctrine and determine therefrom
whether there is any ground for the effort to overturn what, in
this age, was and still is a settled canon of American constitutional
law.
When a lawyer enters the field of legal interpretation, unconsciously perhaps, he becomes at once an historian and research
worker. He is not content with ascertaining the rule, if established, together with its exceptions, but he tries to ascertain thd
reason for the rule and its application. He knows that the rules
of our substantive law are of constant growth, that they are not
the expression of a fleeting conceit of the times but the evolution
of centuries of effort upon the part of legists and lawyers. To
be true they must be founded, not alone in wisdom and prudence
but in the basic conceptions of ultimate truth and justice.
* Member of the bar of Bprkeley County, West Virgini .
158 S.Ct. 437, 439 (1938).
- 58 S.Ct. 483, 494 (1938).
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The corporation is not of common law origin, nor was the concept, which underlies the rule now under discussion, lifted bodily
from another system like, for instance, many of our rules of testamentary law. Whether the corporate idea comes from the
Egyptians, the Greeks or the Romans, it was a development of the
Grecian and the Roman systems. The idea of distinct and continuing personality was well engrafted and thoroughly understood.
Nor was it a crude effort to evolve a necessary phenomenon.
DEVELOPMENT IN THE GRECIAN AND

Ro w

SYSTEMS

The Greeks had their corporate person well defined. The
artificial personality extended to religious societies and trading
associations. 3 Certainly from the fourth century B. 0. down, the
corporate idea with legal and distinct entity, authorized by the
state, written about by Aristotle, with contrasting powers as to
(a) religious purposes and pleasant pastimes and (b) companies
formed for profit, flourished. The element of super-individual per4
sonality was clearly apparent.
The Roman student in the Grecian schools must have brought
the concept back to Rome. Rome had become the capital of the
world. A great system of highways tied the empire together. A class
of capitalists existed. All the legal instruments of commerce were
used. Money became the medium of exchange. Bankers and money
changers lined the Forum. Corporations were numerous.'
The best example of the corporate fiction in the Roman law
was the family. The pater familias was its head, its representative.
If he was lord of its possessions, he was merely a trustee for the
use and benefit of its members. His rights and duties were as much
those of the members of his family as his own. His creditors were
the creditors of the family. His demise was an immaterial matter.
The family never died, in the eye of the law. It was a continuing
'personality. Without breach of continuity, the rights and obligations passed from the head and attached to his successor as the
family representative. Creditors had the same remedies against
that successor. Technically the only difference was one of procedure - the family appeared in court under a slightly modified
8
name.
s ZANE, THE STORY or LAW 124.
4 2 VINOGRADOF, HISTORICAL JURISPRUDENCE 119 et seq.

5 ZANE, THE STORY op LAw 172.
a 2 EVOLUTioN op LAw SERiEs 558.
et seq.

See also Institutes of Justinian:
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Although private corporations were not permitted indiscrininately, and only for such purposes as were sanctioned by the
law, the decrees of the Senate, and constitutions of the Emperors,
they were expressly authorized for the collection of public taxes,
the working of gold, silver and salt mines, for certain guilds in
Rome, as for instance those of bakers, and for ship-owners in
the provinces. They existed as a municipality and were entitled
to have common property, a common treasury and an agent.7 Even
soldiers were permitted, while in camp, to enjoy corporate banking privileges. 8 Dissolution of all corporations was provided for.
The concept of personality was clearly established and defined.
In the opinion of Paulus, the agent required to be appointed to
bring and defend actions, could act only so long as the permission
existed. And Ulpianus declared that where "any thing is owing
to a corporation,it is not due *to the individual members of t1w
same, nor do the latter owe what the entire association does".'
Nor was the corporate entity or universitas without its regulation in the days of the Roman Emperors. Evidently because of
the then existing clamor, the Emperors Valentinian, Theodosius and
Arcadius decreed that no one should be permitted to impose any
new burden upon the inhabitants of Rome, but they ordered that
the privileges of its then existing bodies corporate should remain
intact.10 And persons, who were deans or members of corporate
bodies, who did not discharge the duties of their offices or who
attempted to evade their obligations, and persons who fraudulently
represented they were such deans or members, were the subject
of a prohibitive decree of the Emperors Theodosius and
Valentinian. 1"
Then came the Northern invader. The Goths spread over
Italy and the provinces and almost completely extinguished civilization. Fire destroyed cities and their records. The constant warfare into which the known world was plunged destroyed not alone
the corporate idea but the better customs of the early business world.
Martial law existed largely upon the maxim, " 'Do this', and he
doeth it". The state, represented by its military arm, ruled. There
was no necessity for, if any remembered, the legal corporate entity.
7 3 ScoTT, THE Crvm L&w 30 et seg.
a 11 id. at 10 et seq.
9 3 id. at 32.
10 15 id. at 179.

21 15 id.at 180.
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Centuries passed before civilization dared to raise its head. Many
historians call the thirteenth the greatest of centuries, because of
the wonderful advance in the arts and sciences suppressed in the
years that had gone. The development of law was no exception.
DEVELOPMENT AT THE COIMIaON LAW

Pollock and Maitland say that one of Bracton's contemporaries, Sinibald Fieschi, who became Pope Innocent IV in 1243,
has been called the father of the modern theory of corporations."2
Holdsworth says that he is the first person to call a group of persons a persona ficta.18 If he was the first person in our modern
jurisprudence to apply the principle of distinct personality, it
probably proves that hs was a better student than his contemporaries, for, as we now know, the modern concept of distinct personality was a recognized theory of the Grecian system and of the
Roman law long before md long after the beginning of the Christian era. Certainly it is fair to say that if he did not evolve it, he
was the first of our mod -rn lawyers who applied the principle, because, as we shall see, 1 gal necessity required it. And the legal
necessity was the church
Prior to the recognition of the corporate fiction at the common law, we had it in another form, even in Aethelbert's time.
*When one gave land to a church or for a church, it was conveyed
to the patron saint of the parish. Thus many of the saints, dead
centuries before, were the respective owners. Domesday gives
us numerous examples - St. Paul, St. Peter and St. Constantine
among them. Indeed, it may well be inferred that Aethelbert began the practice when he conveyed "To thee, St. Andrew, and to
thy church at Rochester, where Justus the Bishop presides".14 The
land was held by the parish; the conveyance was for the use and
benefit of the particular church. It was not until the introduction
of the feudal system that we read of advowsons and, later, of benefices.
While there must have been few religious corporations or abbeys
in Bracton's time, and certainly fewer municipal corporations or
boroughs, each must have existed and was recognized in the early
common law, for, writing on jurisdiction and venue, Bracton says
12 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (2d ed. 1923)
13 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw (1923) 470.
14 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 499, 500.
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that a corporate body "should not be drawn out of the county to
make an assize of novel disseynine or of mortdancester". 15
In tracing the history of the corporate entity or juristic person with a separate individuality at the common law, one is
charmed and again disappointed at the apparent lack of intuition
on the part of the common law lawyer. And yet, say Pollock and
Maitland, it would have been surprising had the English lawyers
of Bracton's day obtained a firm hold of the notion of a corporation or Roman universitas. Had they done so, they would have
been ahead of their Italian contemporaries, who had Code and
Digest to set them thinking. Notwithstanding the true theory lay
so plainly on the face of the Roman law books that but to read was
to grasp the concept. Bracton's master, Azo, had not grasped it;
the glossators did not understand it. They stumbled over the difference between an universitas or corporation and the societas or
partnership.""
Probably the best historical account of the development of the
corporate idea at the common law is in Holdsworth, 1 7 although Pollock and Maitland are interesting.' 8 The religious corporation or
abbey seems to have led the way. The abbot, who was its head
by selection of its members or by appointment, was the equivalent
of the pater familias of the Roman family. As the monk became
legally dead when he entered upon a religious life, his personality
became merged - the abbot was his representative. And-while the
English courts had difficulty in determining whether the corporation could commit a tort, for it could neither sin nor be sinned
against, they had little difficulty in evolving the theory that
the abbey, represented by the abbot, could be guilty of a tort
committed by one of the monks in the abbey. Then, too, there
was difficulty in actions pro and con, upon the death of the abbot,
until his successor was elected or appointed. It was the abbot,
the pater familias, if you will, not the aggregate whole, to whom
the law looked and who was the representative of the whole. Depending upon Coke upon Littleton, even Blackstone says that after
death of the head and before selection of his successor, the corporation was in a state of suspended animation."8 And yet, we read
DsLrxmus ANGLIAE (Parliamt ed.) c. xiv, 247.

3

6 BRACTON,

19

1 BL. COMM. 478.

POLLOCK & MAITLAI,), HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 494.
17 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAv 469 et seq.
18 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 486.

16 1
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that as early as 1333, an abbot was successfully sued upon a bond
given by a prior during a vacaney.2 0 The canonical theory of the
persona ficta was beginning to bear fruit. The corporation sole
was being recognized; the church became a "person" in legal
parlance. And this idea then spread to the boroughs and to the
counties, until finally the corporate personality, distinct from its
members, recognized by the law as such, engrafted itself upon our
law. If the church or its members had corporate standing before
the law, why not collections of persons engaged in commercial pursuits? True the religious corporation existed for various and different reasons. The king finally was recognized as a body corporate in a body natural and a body natural in a body corporate.
For certain purposes he was a corporation sole. "The King is
dead, long live the King." If to the church, to the King, to the
City of London, to the boroughs, why not to persons aggregate?
Assumption of corporate powers, with subsequent regal recognition,
led to the corporation by prescription, then by royal charter, and
finally by act of Parliament; although Blackstone says the King's
2
consent is absolutely necessary to the creation of any corporation. '
And the courts were vigilant that no corporation should act beyond its granted powers, nor even then if either violated the rules
of the common law.
Holdsworth says that the growth of the law of a juristic personality or a legal entity, while gradual, reached its present development in the fifteenth century. He proves, by the Year Books,
that in the reigns of Henry VI and Edward IV, we had gotten
well on the way towards that recognition. As early as 21 Edw. IV,
the Year Book, in the Abbot of Hulme's case, recognized the corporation to be invisible, of no substance, a mere name, incapable
of outlawry or excommunication, and yet a person.2
This absorption, development and application of the concept
under discussion, at the common law, is illustrated by an opinion
rendered in 1613:
".... the opinion of Manwood, Chief Baron, was this, as
touching corporations, that they were invisible, immortall,
and that they had no soule; . . . a corporation, is a body
aggregate, none can create soules but.God, but the King creates
them, and therefore they have no soules .
20 Y. B. 7 Edw. InI, f. 35.
211 BL. Comm. 472.

22 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY or ENGLISH LAw
23 Tipling v. Pexall, 2 Bulst. 233 (1613).

484.
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Certainly about the end of the medieval period the persona
ficta of the canon law, the universitas of Rome, our corporate concept, was a well known character in our legal realm. As a corporate aggregate it could take land in fee without the word "suecessors,' '2 although it had to take and grant by deed;25 for as an
artificial being it could act only by deed.
Blackstone, the patron saint of the American lawyer, who
wrote in 1765, says, that after the corporation is formed and
named, among its powers and capacities, in addition to perpetual
succession, to hold land, to have a common seal, and to make bylaws, is "to sue or be sued, implead or be impleaded, grant or
receive, by its corporate name, and to do all other acts as natural
persons may."120 It had won legal recognition as a person at common law.
CoLoNIuL AND PRE-CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT

We now accompany the legal personage to American shores.
Five American colonies owed their inception to trading companies. The London Company, chartered in 1606, developed Virginia; Massachusetts Bay Company, a 1629 aggregation, saved
Plymouth from destruction and started New England on its course;
the Dutch West India Company, established in 1621, laid in New
Netherland the basis of a colony which is our present New York;
the King of Sweden started his West India Company and placed
a settlement on the bdnks of the Delaware; while Georgia, chartered
as late as 1732, as "one body politic and corporate", was founded
as an asylum for poor debtors.27
But these were not exceptions. England, even prior to 1600,
was using the corporate fiction, not alone for purposes of colonial
development all over the known world, but also for the development
of business in practically every line of industrial activity. It may
be that the fundamental difference between the old and new corporate theory - the joint stock capital, had not as yet clearly
manifested itself, but fictitious personality was everywhere assumed, including colonial America.
One must remember that there were few lawyers of any consequence during the earlier colonial days. Those who came with
24 3 Co. L=rT. L c. 1, 8, 7.
2r 3 id. at IL c. 5, 94b 3.
20 1 BL. Comm. 475.
27 BEARD, THE RISE op AmERICAN CIVILIZATION (1930) 35 et seq.
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the planters had passed away, there were no law schools and little
inducement to study; so that it was not until toward the latter
half of the eighteenth century that a few of our men found their
way, at great expense, to the Inns of Court to prepare themselves
for the work at the bar. Courts were largely made up of laymen,
and the right of appeal was at first to the home office of the corporation or palatinate and later to the English courts.
True the assemblies granted charters to or recognized what
were in fact municipal corporations, but for these, generally, express authority existed in the charters or grants. Like England,
our first corporations seemed to be ecclesiastical - one in 1659,
for propagating the Gospel in New England, formed by dissenters;
and the other in 1701, by the Church of England. Both held English charters.
In the educational world, also, we have the incorporation by
Massachusetts in 1659 of Harvard; William and Mary by the
Crown in 1692; and Yale by Connecticut in 1701.
When we come to the business corporation, there was little
or no activity. Recognized in England, as trading corporations,
the colonies resorted to the right to pass laws upon the theory
that their charters contemplated that they might make by-laws.
And their laws were likened to corporate by-laws. Hence, the
Englishman's right to self government found what appeared to be
a sound legal basis. When Parliament considered a bill, in 1701,
to bring under direct control of the throne all of the colonies not
already subject thereto, it was urged that, if enacted, the act would
establish a precedent to take away the charter of any corporation,
without compensation. It was then defeated, but afterwards
passed in a different form.
There were voluntary associations in the colonies, with special
privileges, like the Undertakers of the Iron Works, in Massachusetts in 1643,2" and for frontier settlement in Virginia, in 1701,20
but these had not the appearance of the true corporate fiction.
Several were incorporated in England, it is true, like the Ohio
Company in 1749.
The colonies were becoming corporation conscious, however.
Maryland incorporated the Patapsco Iron Works Company in 1731.
Connecticut granted a charter to the New London Society in 1732."
28 Mass. Col. Records 1642-9.
29

3 Hening Stats. 1701, 204.

3o Col. Records of Conn. VIII, 390.
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Following the grant of several small charters of little consequence,
Massachusetts granted a joint stock charter to the Manufacturing
Company in 1740, over the protest of the Governor." Parliament
then passed the act of 1741, extending to the colonies the "Bubble
Act" of 1720. No modern blue sky law, this. It forbade for the
future any American grants of corporate privileges for business
purposes, under pain of praemunire. Every lawyer knows the
penalties and pains of praemunire.
This ended the dream of colonial legislatures for the American
development of business; although, it is said, Pennsylvania passed
an act in 1768, incorporating a fire insurance company. Evidently
the incorporators were told of the act of 1740 by Parliament, and
its penalties, for no organization was made thereunder. And, it
is said, this was the reason for the clause in the Declaration of
Independence: "For taking away our Charters, abolishing our
most valuable laws, and altering fundamentally the Forms of our
Governments." 32 Thus passeth the colonial period.
With some exceptions, the War for Independence was a political and not a social revolution. One of these exceptions, as it
developed, was the corporate fiction. The English corporation held
its franchise as a special favor. It was an irrevocable grant. Ordinarily it was in the nature of a monopoly. The developed American theory, on the other hand, was that the corporation could
come into existence only for the public good. Hence the early
passage of general incorporation laws by most of the states notably New York in 1784, Delaware in 1787, and Pennsylvania
in 1791. Then began the decline of the old theory of liberality
of construction. But the fundamental theory was retained - it
was a person, it had all the rights of a person, in the absence of a
particular exception or prohibition."3
With independence, came the demand for corporate charters.
The Bank of North America was chartered by Congress in 1781,
and was organized for the purpose of restoring the failing credit
of the Confederacy. It is still functioning under its ancillary
charter gotten from Pennsylvania in 1787. We have the model
Virginia act of 1785, incorporating the Potowmack Company.3
31 Colonial Soc. of Mass. I-I.
32 Read SIMEON E. BALDWIN, 3
237.
33 I.

SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLo-ALERICAN

HmsTORY

at 254.

34 11 Hening Stats. 1784, 510 et seq.
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Maryland passed the same act the next year. Massachusetts chartered The Massachusetts Bank in 1784, and The Proprietors of
Charles River Bridge in 1785. Pennsylvania chartered The Mutual
Assurance Company in 1786, and New York added its contribution
to our inquiry in 1786, by incorporating the Associated Manufacturing Iron Company. In all of these corporations, the doctrine
of legal personality is preeminent. Not only was it so intended,
but it was necessary, if they were to be successful, to attract
foreign capital. And even George Washington made that effort for
the Potowmack Company.'
Let us scan for a moment, too, the language of the state constitutions adopted prior to the Constitutional Convention.
The protection of life, liberty and property was paramount in
the bills of rights of these earlier documents. Virginia led the way
with George Mason's bill of rights - the first enactment of its assembly. The principles of the Virginia act were adhered to in the
other colonies, as we know, although Connecticut and Rhode Island
existed under their former charters until 1818 and 1842, respectively.
Then, too, the common law was declared to be in force and
effect in practically all of the original colonies. Some of them,
as for instance New York in 1777, incorporated it in its
constitution. Virginia's fourth act provided for its adoption, and
declared, inter alia, that it "shall be the rule of decision (in the
courts) and shall be considered as in full force, until the same shall
be altered by the legislative power of this colony."3°
Not only, then, at and prior to the adoption of the national
Constitution had the states, which had acted, provided for protection of property, but all of them had expressly provided for
the continuance of the counnon law system. Congress, under the
Confederation, as we observed, granted a charter in 1781, under
its supposed incidental powers; the states, having unquestioned
authority, had granted corporate charters, and two of them - New
York and Delaware - had enacted general statutes for the incorporation of companies.
And in the Constitutional Convention, imbued with the idea
that no incidental powers were being granted, Mr. Madison moved
on August 18th, 1787, that several additional powers be vested in
35 See Jefferson's letter, dated May 7th, 1788, at Paris, to Monsieur Tor-

rasson, 7 WunTn'Gos OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 6 (1854).
3a 9 Hening Stats. 1776, 126.
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Congress, among them the power to grant charters of corporations.17 This effort slept in the committee to which it was referred.
On the last day when amendments could be made, he brought up
the proposals in a different form. They were defeated.3 s The
difference is significant. He is said to have been convinced by
some of his fellow delegates, notably Mr. Gouverner Morris of
New York, that Congress would have incidental power to carry
out its enumerated ones. So on the last day, Mr. Madison contented
himself with canals and a university. Mr. Robert Morris wanted
an express grant for a bank, but he was silenced by Mr. King, of
New York, who stated that banks were not so popular and their
inclusion would weaken the chances of adoption. 9 That a large
part of the commerce of the world was then carried on by corporations and that the Convention took cognizance of this fact was
later recognized by the Court in construing the commerce clause.4"
And that this incidental power was thoroughly understood is illustrated by the debate in the Virginia convention called to ratify
the Constitution. 4 Indeed the Tenth Amendment was intended to
obviate this difficulty, but the word "expressly" was omitted.
Consequently the courts never doubted that the incidental power
42
existed.
Congress early recognized the reality of the incidental power
by incorporating the first bank in 1791. Even before the Fifth
Amendment was part of the Constitution then, we had recognition
by the common law, by the states, by the Constitutional Convention,
and by the first Congress that a corporation was a person.
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FIFTIH AMENDMENT

We are aware that there is no common law of the United
States in the sense of a national customary law, distinct from the
law of England.
"There is, however, one clear exception to the statement
that there is no national common law. The interpretation of
the Constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced
371 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CoNSTTUTIoN
38 1 id.at 310.
895

(1836) 247.

id. at 544.

40 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1869).
413 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FzEDERAL CONSTITUTION

461.

Patrick Henry

urged that Congress had the incidental right to do all things not expressly

prohibited.
42Ez parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651, 28 L. Ed. 274 (1884); McCulloch
v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 406, 4 L. Ed. 579, 601 (1819).
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by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of
the English comm6n law, and are to be read in the light of its
history. The code of constitutionaland statutory construction
which, therefore, is gradually formed by the judgments of
this court, in the application of the Constitution and the laws
and treaties made in pursuance thereof, has for its basis so
much of the common law as may be implied in the subject,
and constitutes a common law resting on national authority." 4 3
And prior to Smith v. Alabama,44 construing the Court of
Claims Act, where the act was silent as to rules of evidence it should
adopt or follow, the Court said:
"In our opinion, it must be governed by law; and we
know of no system of law by which it should be governed other
than the common law. That is the system from which our
judicial ideas and legal definitions are derived. The language
of the Constitution and of many acts of Congress could
not
4
be understood without reference to the common law." ,
In reality this is true. A distinguished English teacher,
whether in praise or in jest, one knows not, says that the Constitution was written by men who had Magna Charta and Coke
upon Littleton before their eyes."
"No person shall be, deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law", says the Fifth Amendment. What
is meant by the word "person"?
"Law is the philosophy of life." It is the embodiment of
the social reactions of any given age. Hence we approach the
subject from the historical setting of the age.
Speaking of the first ten and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, Judge Cooley once remarked "that the
first ten took from the Union no power it ought ever to have exercised, and that the last three required of the States the surrender
47
of no power which any free government should ever employ."
It can be urged that the Fifth Amendment was never directly
interpreted by the Court. But, if not, "it has been assumed, if
not expressly held, that the provision protects the property of corporations against confiscation equally with that of individuals." 4 8
43 Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 478, 31 L. Ed. 508 (1888), citing
Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 59, 8 L. Ed. 1055 (1834). Italics supplied.
44 124 U. S. 465, 31 L. Ed. 508 (1888).
45Moore v. United States, 1 Otto 270, 274, 23 L. Ed. 346 (876).
46 PLUCKNuT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COmoN LAW (1929) 40.
47 COOLEY, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTIUTIONA LAw (1891) 210.
4 Mr. Justice Field, sitting in circuit, in County of San Mateo v. R. R. Co.,
13 Fed. 145, 151 (C. C. D. Cal. 1882).
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Yet as was said by Judge Carr, the point (that corporations are
not persons) may never have been made before, but, when raised,
49
the court must pass upon it.
"A constitution, from its nature, deals in generals, not in
detail. Its framers cannot perceive minute distinctions which
arise in the progress of the nation, and therefore confine it
to the establishment of broad and general principles.""0
And that the makers of the Constitution knew that Congress
had the power to incorporate companies "which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into execution" the enumerated powers,
one has but to recall the words of ir. Chief Justice Marshall:
"This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the.
varions crises of huAmnan affairs. To have prescribed the means
by which government should, in all future time, execute its
powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of
the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It
would have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable
rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been
and which can be best provided for as they
seen dimly,
1
occur."
Why may not the same character of interpretation be placed
upon the inhibitions of the Constitution? Is it not the means to
the end? "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the constitution," and all means not prohibited, come within its
2
letter and spirit.1
To digress for a paragraph, let us recall a problem that was
of moment early in our judicial history. The question arose
whether a corporation could sue in the federal courts. Was it.a
citizen? The Court solved the problem by piercing the corporate
veil, as it will do to-day in cases of fraud, and ascertaining the
citizenship of the stockholders. If the requisite diverse citizenship
existed, the jurisdiction was unquestioned. " Although corporations had been before the Court from its organization, the question
was not raised until 1809. In Bank v. Deveaux, the Court re49 Stribbling v. Bank of Valley, 5 Rand. 132, 141 (Va. 1827).
-0 Mr. Chief Sustice Marshall in Bank of United States v. Deveaux, '5 Cranch
61, 87, 3 L. Ed. 38, 45 (1809).
51 McCulloeh v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 415, 4 L. Ed. 579, 603 (1819). Italics
supplied.
52 Ia. at 421.
53 Bank v. Devearux, 5 Cranch 61, 3 L. Ed. 38 (1809).
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sorted to English cases for aid. It found "that corporations have
been included within terms of description appropriated to real
persons."
While it is true that the Court, in this case, to solve
the jurisdictional question, asserted that it might ascertain the
citizenship of the stockholders of the corporation because they
were "substantially and essentially the parties;" yet this rule of
decision, by subsequent cases was developed until it determined,
once and for all, that when a corporation is created by the laws
of a state, the legal presumption is that its members are citizens
of the state in which alone the corporate body has a legal
existence, and that no averment or evidence to the contrary is
admissible for the purpose of withdrawing the suit from the jurisdiction of a federal court.5 4 It is, therefore, a citizen within the
jurisdictional clause of the Constitution. It is not, however, a
citizen, as we know, enjoying the rights and privileges of the
citizens of the several states, for the reason that, if so, the
states would have no control over a foreign corporation.55 In the
state of its creation, however, this inhibition does not exist. This
right does not inure in favor of corporations existing under the
laws of the District of Columbia or of the territories, because diverse state citizenship does not exist.5 0
In 1823, following the Dartmouth College case,"7 hereinafter
commented upon, the Supreme Court held that an English
eleemosynary corporation was a person within the meaning of the
treaty of peace with Great Britain, the fifth article of which provided "there shall be no future confiscations made,.., against any
person or persons", etc. Vermont attempted to confiscate the
property by act of 1794. The corporation's property rights were
protected.' 8
The Court, in 1826, decided that a corporation was a "person"
within the purview of a criminal statute. Mr. Justice Story, who
wrote the opinion in that case, inter alia, said:
"That corporations are, in law, for civil purposes, deemed
persons is unquestionable. And the citation from 2 Inst. 736,
establishes, that they are so deemed within the purview of
penal statutes. Lord Coke, there, in commenting on the statute
Ut Ohio & Miss. R. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black 286, 17 L. Ed. 130 (1861).
55 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1869).
56 Hepburn & Dundas v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445, 2 L. Ed. 332 (1804).
57 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819).
58 Society for Propagation of Gospel, etc. v. Town of New Haven, 8 Wheat.
464, 5 L. Ed. 662 (1823).
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of 31 Eliz. ch. 7, respecting the erection of cottages, where the
word used is 'no person shall', &c. says 'this extends as well
to persons politic and incorporate, as to natural persons whatsoever.' 59
This case has been uniformly followed in the construction of
statutes.
"No authority has been adduced to show, that a corporation may not, in the construction of statutes, be regarded
as a natural person: while, on the contrary, authorities have
been cited which show, tMat corporations are to be deemed as
persons, when the circumstances in which they are placed, are
identical with those of natural persons, expressly included in
such statutes." 6
And in 1839, on appeal from the Alabama circuit, the Court decided that the federal courts were open for the suit by a foreign
corporation for the enforcement of a contract authorized to be
made by it in its domicil, against a citizen of another state. True
it had no legal existence out of the boundaries of its creator and it
existed only in contemplation of law; yet it could act by agent
just as a natural person and under the law of comity it could sue
in a foreign jurisdiction just as a natural person. "It is indeed a
mere artificial being, invisible and intangible; yet it is a person,
for certain purposes in contemplation of law, and-has been recognized as such by .the decisions of this Court.""' It has the same
right as, but no greater constitutional right than a natural per62

son.

Whatever property it owns, it holds as a natural person does.
And the franchise itself is property. It is a legal estate vested in
the corporation itself as soon as it is in esse. It is a power coupled
with an interest. This property right is protected by the Constitution under the contract impairment clause. It "may act as a single
individual ... It is no more a State instrument, than a natural
person exercising the same powers would be." 6 3 Here is complete
ri United States v. Amedy, 11 Wheat. 392, 412, 6 L. Ed. 502, 507 (1826).
60 Beaston v. Farmers' Bank of Delaware, 12 Pet. 102, 134, 9 L. Ed. 1017
(1838). Italics supplied.
61 Tr.Chief Justice Taney in Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, 588,
10 L. Ed. 274 (1839). Italics supplied.
62 West River Bridge Co. v. Jos. Dix & Brattleboro, 6 How. 507, 534, 12 L.

Ed. 535 (1848).

63 Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat.
518, 636, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819).
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recognition that it is a "person" within the meaning of the Constitution. And the frandhise which it possesses may be taxed.0
All of these cases, except the last, were decided prior to the
submission of the Fourteenth Amendment. This paper is not intended to be an exhaustive treatise on the subject, but merely a
cursory examination to satisfy one's mind as to the condition of
the law before and at the time of the submission of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Sufficient is suggested to prove that the law makers,
when the amendment was submitted, could not have been unmindful that a corporation was a "person" under the Constitution, in
the treaty of. peace with England, in the federal statutes, and in
business transactions in which a corporation engaged.
When we go beyond the federal realm and seek confirmation
and cumulative assurances in the concurring understanding of the
state courts, the evidence is overwhelming. It may be well stated,
as a truism, that the word "person" is a generic term and includes both natural and artificial persons, unless the subject matter or context limits the language to natural persons."s Consonant
with the other states, the early Virginia cases all regarded a corporation as a person. 6 These cases were decided before the division of the state and prior to the submission of the Amendment.
Probably the effect of the inhibition contained in the Fifth
Amendment against the deprivation of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, in so far as property is concerned, as
being limited to natural persons and excluding corporations, is
best expressed by Mr. Justice Field:
"But such has not been the construction of the courts.
A similar provision is found in nearly all of the state consitutions; and everywhere, and at all times, and in all courts,
it has been held, either by tacit assent or express adjudication,
to extend, so far as their property is concerned, to corporations. And this has been because the property of a corporation is in fact the property of the corporators. To deprive the
64

Society of Savings v. Coite, 6 Wall. 594, 18 L. Ed. 897 (1868).

65 2

SUTHERLAND,

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (2d ed. by Lewis, 1904) 770.

See also the word "personII as applied to corporations in 6 WORDS & PHRASES
(1904) 5322 et seq., and cases cited.
66 As a person it can commit usury, Stribbling v. Bank of Valley, 5 Rand.
132 (Va. 1827) ; for civil purposes it is a person and is subject to garnishment,
B. & 0. v. Gallahue's Adm'rs, 12 Gratt. 655, 65 Am. Dec. 254 (Va. 1855);
the property of a foreign corporation may be subjected to a debt, Bank of
United States v. Merchants Bank, 1 Rob. 573 (Va. 1843) ; a foreign corporation
can be excluded from the state, even though a person in its domicil, Slaughter
v. Commonwealth, 18 Gratt. 767 (Va. 1856).
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corporation of its property, or to burden it, is, in fact, to deprive the corporators of their property or to lessen its value.
Their interest, undivided though it be, and constituting only
a right during the continuance of the corporation to participate in Its dividends, and on its dissolution to receive a
proportionate share of its assets, has an appreciable value, and
is property in a commercial sense, and whatever affects the
property of the corporation necessarily affects the commercial
value of their interests."'e
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENIDMENT

When the Fourteenth Amendment was submitted to Congress
on the 30th of April, 1866, the language of the first paragraph is
as it was submitted. The debate added to but did not change the
language of that section, so far as making applicable to the States
the inhibition to deprive one of life, liberty and property without
due process of law. The words added established United States
citizenship in the first sentence, and "nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws" in the
latter part0s It was submitted on June 16th. With it was introduced a bill, which passed, providing that when any state "lately
in insurrection shall have ratified the same and shall have modified its constitution and laws in conformity therewith" such state,
upon ratification of the Amendment, should be given representation in Congress.
Now we come to the dissenting opinion of Air. Justice Black
who argues that the word "person" in the Fourteenth Afmendment
does not include corporations or legal persons 9 He says, when
submitted, that "the people were not told that the states of the
South were to be denied their normal relationship with the Federal
Government unless they ratified an amendment granting new and
revolutionary rights to corporations."
It is true, as Mr. Justice Black argues, that "the history of
the Amendment proves that the people were told that its purpose
was to protect weak and helpless human beings and were not told
that it was intended to remove corporations in any fashion from
the control of the state government". But the same argument
can be made with relation to the late lamented so-called Child
Labor Amendment, and the powers of Congress under it, upon
the pretext that it was a child employment amendment.
67 The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 Fed. 722, 746 (C. C. D. Cal. 1882).
68 2 BLAiNE, TwENTY YEARS IN CONGRESS (1886) 204, 214.

69 Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 58 S. Ct. 437 (1938).
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The fallacy of Mr. Justice Black's argument, however, lies not
in comparison but in fact, and is twofold: (a) he assumes that it
granted new and revolutionary rights to corporations, and (b)
that it removed corporations from the control of state governments.
The Amendment granted no "new and revolutionary rights to
corporations". It merely restrained the states from depriving the
corporation, as well as all other persons, of its property without
due process. It created no new legal or fundamental rights, but
operated on the legal rights existing at its adoption. 0 Mr. Justice
Black is from Alabama. He overlooked the same clause, which
has been in every constitution framed by the people of Alabama:
"Nor shall he be deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by
due process of law."'" The clause of the Alabama constitution
just quoted, as well as the remainder of its bill of rights was the
governing and controlling part of the constitution in force in 1838,
and all of its general powers were expounded, and their operation
extended or restrained, with reference to it.7' The clause did not
prevent a corporation de jure from condemning property. 8 A
corporation is a person in Alabama ;74 and the legislature cannot
7
take away vested rights. 5
The Fourteenth Amendment did not remove corporations
from the control of state governments, as suggested by Mr. Justice
Black, nor prevent the state courts from interpreting what is equal
protection of the laws. This is sustained by the recent cases decided by the supreme court of Alabama.70
It cannot be' said, whatever may have been the record of
hearings before Congress, that only the committee, sitting in secret
session, knew the effect of the language of the Amendment, as
stated in the opinion. Nor can it be said, that the members of
Congress did not know that the word "person", as used in the
Amendment, meant and included corporations. There is no word
in it that did not undergo the completest scrutiny. There is no
United States v. Cruikshank, 2 Otto 542, 23 L. Ed. 588 (1876).
71 ALA. CONsT. 1819, art. 1, § 10; 1865, art. 1, § 7; 1867, art. 1, § 8; 1875,
art. 1, § 7; 1901, art. 1, § 6.
72an re Dorsey, 7 Port. 293 (Ala. 1838).
73 Aldridge v. Tuseumbia, C. & D. R. R. Co., 2 Stew. & P. 199, 23 Am. Dec.
307 (Ala. 1832).
74 Planters' & Merchants' Bank v. Andrews, 8 Port. 404, 426 (Ala. 1839).
7- Coosa River Steamboat Co. v. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120 (1857).
These last
70

three cases are from digests and have not been read by the writer.

70 McDavid v. Bank of Minette, 193 Ala. 341, 69 So. 452 (1915); Doe ex
dem. State Land Co. v. Roe, 166 Ala. 63, 51 So. 991 (1909).
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word in it that was not scanned, and intended to mean the full and
beneficial thing it seems to mean. There was no discussion omitted;
there was no conceivable posture of affairs to the people, who had
it in hand, which was not considered."7 It may be, in the effort to
secure the submission and its adoption after submission, that little
emphasis was laid upon the interpretation of its language, and
that less was said about it.
Constitutional interpretation is interesting the world over.
Judicial science has developed and determined various general
rules of interpretation. The instrument of the law is language.
And language has rules of its own. We must understand the
language in which the law is written. And a living language is
flexible and changeable.7 8 Hence the Court, in its wisdom, as we
have seen, has followed the rules of the common law in the interpretation of the Constitution. Those definitions and interpretations, therefore, are as inflexible as possible, so far as language
is concerned, and flexible as to application of language. As simplicity is an art the acquirement of which is long to be desired,
so, too, is the art of constitutional construction.
Probably best stated, the words of a constitution are to be con79
No state court has better
strued in their most usual signification.
stated the rules of constitutional construction than that of Alabama. It has held (a) that constitutions are to be construed in
tiLe light of the common law and previously existing constitutions
and provisions designed for protection of life, liberty and property
are to be liberally construed;" (b) that the Constitution is not to
receive technical construction ;1 and (c) that the history of a
constitutional provision, the causes which led to its adoption, and
the mischief it was intended to remedy, will not be considered in
determining the construction of it, if the language is plain
and unambiguous.82 These cases are in line with the decisions
of our courts. The application of them constitutes a complete
refutation of the theory sought to be established by Mir. Justice
Black
77 3 WARRE,

THE SupRmif COUnT (1922) 263, quoting Senator George F.

Edmunds.

7s Pitamic, Some Aspects of the FProb~em of Interpretation (1933) 58 A. B.

A. REP. 255.

79 American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 45 L. Ed. 102 (1900).
so Henry v. State, 218 Ala. 71, 117 So. 626 (1928).
81 State Docks Co. v. State, 227 Ala. 414, 150 So. 345 (1933).
82 State v. MecGough, 118 Ala. 159, 24 So. 395 (1898).
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Notwithstanding these cases of the Supreme Court of the
United States and of the state of Alabama, to sustain his position,
11r. Justice Black urges that when the Slaughter-House cases were
before the Court in 1873, less than five years after the proclamation of adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court had
apparently discovered no purpose on the part of the people to construe the word "person" in the amendment to include a corporation. Apparently he did not closely study the language of the
opinion of Mr. Justice Miller:
"The argument has not been much pressed in these cases
that the defendant's charter deprives the plaintiffs of their
property without due process of law, or that it denies to them
the equal protection of the law. The first of these paragraphs
has been in the Constitution since the adoption of the fifth
amendment, as a restraint upon the Federal power. It is also
to be found in some form of expression in the constitutions of
nearly all the States, as a restraint upon the power of the
States. This law then, has practically been the same as it now
is during the existence of the government, except so far as
the present amendment may place the restraining power over
the States in this matter in the hands of the Federal government.
"We are not without judicial interpretation, therefore,
both State and National, of the meaning of this clause. And
it is sufficient to say that under no construction of that provision that we have ever seen, or any that we deem admissible,
can the restraint imposed by the State of Louisana upon the
exercise of their trade by the butchers of New Orleans be held
to be a deprivation of property within the meaning of that
provision. "83
In other words, the question of deprivation of property was
not an issue; therefore it was immaterial whether the Amendment
covered a corporation under the word "person". In the syllabi,
the Court said that it was not necessary to inquire into the full
forco of the clause forbidding a state to enforce any law which
deprives a person of life, liberty or property, because it was not
applicable to the present case.
When the question did arise, the Court unanimously determined that the word "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment did
83 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 80, 21 L. Ed. 395 (1873).
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apply to a corporation. 84 This construction it has consistently
followed 0
The reasoning of Mr. Justice Black, in the case under consideration, is antagonistic to settled principles of constitutional
construction. The consistent line of decisions of the Federal courts
and of the state courts, is at variance with his proposed judicial
doctrine.
With all due deference, it can be justly said that the opinion
of Mr. Justice Black is a legal rarity. From a standpoint of
judicial interpretation, it is the only moden discordant note upon
legalistic and super-individual personality; and, as a contribution
to constitutional exposition, it stands alone.
EFCT OF PRoPOsED THEORY
Mr. Justice Black, as evidenced by his later concurring
opinion,80 has determined to insist upon his theory to exclude corporations from the protection of the word "person" in the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. While not binding as a rule of
construction upon state courts, the interpretation, if established,
would be persuasive as to the same language in state constitutions.
If accomplished, what is the effect ? Then a fact, and not a theory,
would confront the American lawyer.
The corporate concept has been the greatest legal factor in the
expansion of our country. Our development of this corporate
fiction has grown until today there are few persons of any wealth
who do not own some kind of corporate security. The widow and
the orphan are its beneficiaries. Charitable and.educational institutions largely depend upon income derived from corporate investments for their operation. All of our railroads and insurance
companies are corporate beings. Banking is now generally done by
he corporate entity. Over ninety-five percent of the mining and
quarrying operations are carried on by it. Practically every publie utility business is operated under its guidance. It is estimated
that over ninety-four percent of the manufacturing business is
done by the corporate form. Rough estimates place over forty
percent of wholesale sales made by corporations in 1925, and at the
same time corporations conducted about thirty percent of all retail
84 Santa Clara Co. v. So. Pa. R. R. Co., 118 U. S. 394, 30 L. Ed. 118 (1886).
85 Pembina C. S. Mining & M. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 31 L. Ed.
650 (1888), and cases decided since that time.
80 United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v. Texas, 58 S. Ct. 483 (1938).
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sales. Nearly five percent of the farms of the country are operated
in like manner. Only the professions have found no use for it. In
practically every field into which the corporation has entered it is
wholly or partially dominant. It possesses a quality of enterprise
which a century ago was only in embryo- the quality of multiple ownership. Add to this statement, the fact that the great percentage of labor is employed by corporations, and you have a
fairly concise picture of the corporate entity in American economic
87
life.
On the other hand, the corporate fiction has often been used
as a cloak for unethical practices. There have been evils and
many of them, and there will be in the future. Railroad rebates,
banking evils, monopolistic practices, labor depression and other
baneful disturbances have been exposed from time to time.8 Our
law books give us many other instances. Regulation, properly and
fairly applied, is not an unmitigated evil. Whether we should go
to the extent of licensing all corporations, directly or indirectly
interested in interstate commerce, as proposed by Senator 0 'Mahoney's bill now pending before Congress, is not a matter of discussion here. The trouble lies in determining where the complete
rights of private property should end and regulation should begin
and how far it should extend. Property rights and duties are coextensive. It cannot be denied, in other words, that money talks;
the thing to be prevented in honest, stable government is that it
should talk with more tongues than belong to it. It may be that
some of these matters were uppermost in the mind of Mr. Justice
Black when he indited this opinion. Applied in the manner suggested by him, it would kill the goose which has added to our economic surplus year after year.
The national government, too, as well as the states, has now
adopted the corporate form to execute many of its governmental
functions. By this method, the national government is now engaging in private business in competition with its citizens, free
from the burden of taxation, and, in many instances, it challenges
the right of the state to regulate its activities within the borders
of the state. This is an added problem that demands solution.
But the American lawyers are capable of solving these problems. A bar which evolved from all the governmental systems
87sBEsL

& ME Ns, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 10

et aeg.
88 ADA s, THE Epic op A ERICA (1934) 270-306.
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of the world, a plan such as we have, is not unfit in these days to
analyze and apply a remedy to those conditions which require
rectification. Our anxiety should be to find and declare the proper
course of action between the demands of the propertied idealists
on the one hand and the apostles of social discontent on the other.
It cannot be solved in the manner attempted by Mr. Justice Black
Society demands the continuance and not the elimination of the
corporate fiction. Adopt Mr. Justice Black's new theory, unsupported by precedent, antagonistic to the hypotheses of our governmental structure, at war with the fundamental principles of our
economic system, introduce it into this caldron, and where are we?
The field of argument and deduction is too wide. It is sufficient to
say that legal chaos would result and the rights of private property
would be relegated to the storehouse of ancient heirlooms.
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